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THE PUBLIC WELFARE RATIONALE: DEFINING MENS REA IN RCRA
J. MANLY PARKS*
The green movement, as it is sometimes called,' has appeared on
America's political and social horizons suddenly -- a summer storm
thundering warnings of an environmental apocalypse. The 1960s
witnessed the birth of modem environmentalism in the United States.2
Within thirty years the issue has grown into one of the primary world
concerns, as witnessed by the recent Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.3
The growth of environmental awareness has brought a new
method of enforcement of environmental regulations: criminal
punishment.4 This trend of punishing criminally environmental crimes
has been well documented and analyzed.' Some commentators feel that
these laws are steps in the proper direction. In support, they have
offered justifications for the use of criminal sanctions as a method of
* B.A. Colgate University, 1991; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary, expected 1994.
1. See Roger D. Wynne, Defining "Green": Toward Regulation of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 785, 785-86 (1991).
2. See, e.g., MARTIN V. MELOSI, COPING WITH ABUNDANCE 296-97 (1985)
(associating the beginning of modem environmentalism with the publication of Rachel
Carson's SILENT SPING in 1962).
3. See Paul Lewis, The Earth Summit, Battle in Rio, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at Al.
4. Examples of Federal Statutes providing criminal sanctions for regulatory violations
include Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1988);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615(b) (1988); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988) (also known as RCRA); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)
(1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988) (also known as "Superfund"); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(4) (1988). See also
Robert A. Milne, Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental
Statutes: Strict Criminal Liability in Substance But Not Form, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 307,
324-28 (1989) (reviewing intent requirements in federal environmental laws which
provide for criminal punishment).
5. Many commentators have discussed the birth and development of the criminal
enforcement of environmental regulations. See, e.g., Karen M. Hansen, Knowing
Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 987 (1990); Milne, supra note 4;
Rebecca S. Webber, Comment, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes, 16
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53 (1988).
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enforcing environmental regulations including: the increased awareness
of environmental responsibility and reprioritization of environmental
protection," the failure of civil enforcement through monetary fines
because the. cost of compliance with the regulations is greater than the
amount of the fine imposed for violations,7 and the belief that criminal
sanctions will result in greater compliance due to the stigma attached to
a criminal offense.8
Much of the recent debate surrounding the use of these criminal
sanctions has focused on the concept of mens rea,9or "ill will," and its
role in these criminal statutes.'° Many commentators have remarked
that when interpreting the mens rea requirements of federal
environmental statutes, courts have "lowered" the intent necessary to
convict a . defendant for a criminal violation. " Some commentators
have condemned this trend, 2 while others have welcomed it. 3  This
debate, however, neglects to evaluate the rationale behind the actions of
these courts.
An examination of the scholarly reviews and judicial decisions on
one criminal environmental statute, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA),' 4 reveals that courts applying this statute
6. Milne, supra note 4, at 308-09, 318. But see Brian E. Concannon, Jr., Comment,
Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes and the Knowledge Requirement, 25
CRIM. L. REv. 535, 538 (1988) for a different analysis of the public perception of
pollution.
7. Concannon, supra note 6, at 537-38; Milne, supra note 4, at 320.
8. Concannon, supra note 6, at 538. See generally, Milne, supra note 4, at 319
(offering justifications for the use of criminal sanctions to punish corporate officers).
9. The term "mens rea" describes the culpable state of mind required of the defendant
in all criminal convictions, excepting strict liability. See infra text accompanying note
29. For a complete discussion of the role of the mental state requirement in criminal
law, see I CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (14th ed. 1978).
10. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 5, at 997-98 (describing the courts' reduction of mens
rea for environmental crimes); Judith lanelli, Note, Lessening the Mens Rea
Requirement for Hazardous Waste Violations, 16 VT. L. REV. 419, 420 (1991) (calling
for states to "adopt a lesser mens rea [requirement] than RCRA's 'knowing' standard");
Milne, supra note 4, at 309 (arguing that environmental statutes with mens rea
requirements actually impose strict liability in substance).
!1. Hansen, supra note 5, at 997-98; lanelli, supra note 10, at 426; Milne, supra note
4, at 328.
12. Hansen, supra note 5, at 987-88.
13. Milne, supra note 4, at 333.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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consistently interpret the mens rea requirement as minimal.' 5  By
borrowing from strict liability rationales, courts have fashioned a rule of
construction and applied it to the mental state requirement in public
welfare regulations. This rule reverses the traditional rule requiring strict
interpretation of a criminal statute against the state.' 6 Nowhere have
courts applied this rule of construction more extensively than in the
interpretation of the knowing requirement of RCRA.
This Article will follow the early development of the "public
welfare rationale" from which this rule of construction is derived, tracing
its roots in strict liability to its application to statutes regulating matters
of public welfare. This Article will then examine the further
development of this rationale in the area of environmental criminal
enforcement by following the judicial interpretation of the mens rea
requirement of RCRA.
Using these foundations, this Article will demonstrate that the
courts' use of the public welfare rationale to interpret restrictively the
intent requirements of RCRA is warranted. Furthermore, this Article will
propose that the public welfare rationale helps to resolve the current
dispute between federal circuits as to the proper interpretation of the
intent language in RCRA.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE RATIONALE
A. Strict Liability Origins
The special rule of construction created by the public welfare
rationale is best understood when juxtaposed with the general rule for
interpreting the mens rea requirements of criminal statutes. The widely
recognized rule of statutory interpretation for criminal cases dictates that
a court must strictly interpret the language of a criminal statute against
the state.' 7 Morisette v. United Statess sets out the basic scheme for
interpreting statutory requirements of mens rea.
In Morisette, a man was convicted of unlawful conversion for
collecting and selling the scrap metal he had taken from government
15. See infra parts I.C. through II.C.2.
16. For an explanation of the traditional rule, see I TORCIA, supra note 9, § 12.
17. See id
18. 342 U.S. 246 (1951).
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property.' 9 Relying on a previous line of cases, the Court of Appeals
ruled that because the statute omitted any mention of a criminal intent
requirement, none was required to convict under it.2° In taking issue
with the lower court's interpretation, the Supreme Court distinguished the
cases upon which the lower court had relied, saying that the offenses
prohibited in those prior cases were "aptly called 'public welfare
offenses. ' '2  "While such offenses do not threaten the security of the
state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against
its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls
deemed essential to the social order.... In this respect whatever the intent
of the violator, the injury is the same. 22
The Supreme Court contrasted these "public welfare offenses" to
the statute under which Morisette was convicted, based on the fact that
the conversion statute sought to prevent a form of the common law
offense of larceny.23 The Court reasoned that, by codifying a common
law crime which required mens rea, Congress had implied that it
intended to retain mens rea as an element of the crime after
codification.24  Thus, while applying the traditional rule in Morisette,
the Court recognized a special rule of interpretation for "public welfare
statutes. ,25
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Morisette,26 public welfare
statutes were first given special treatment as a class in United States v.
Balint.21 In Balint, the defendants were charged with selling derivatives
of coca leaves and opium under a federal statute criminalizing the sale
of certain narcotics. 28 The defendants claimed that because they had
not been charged with knowing that the substance they possessed was an
opium or coca derivative, the state had failed to charge -- and prove --
the criminal intent necessary for conviction.29 The statute in question
19. Id. at 247-48.
20. Id. at 250.
21. Id. at 255.
22. Id. at 256.
23. See id. at 260-61.
24. See id. at 260"62.
25. Id. at 255.
26. See id at 250.
27. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
28. Id. at 251.
29. Id.
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did not mention intent as an element of the crime which it punished.3 °
In holding that the statute did not require mens rea as an element of
conviction,3 the Court reasoned that Congress had balanced the harm
of punishing a violator who lacked ill will against the threat of "exposing
innocent purchasers to the danger of the drug, and concluded that the
latter was the result preferably to be avoided."32 Thus, the Court
justified a strict liability" interpretation of the statute on the grounds
that the "State may in the maintenance of a public policy"34 prohibit
certain acts or omissions in order to achieve a public benefit."
In United States v. Dotterweich, 36 decided over twenty years
later, the Supreme Court again applied the public welfare rationale. In
Dotterweich, a corporate officer of a drug distributing company was
convicted under a statute criminalizing the sale of misbranded drugs,
despite the absence of any proof that the officer had personal knowledge
of the misbranding." The Supreme Court, relying in part on Balint,
concluded that when Congress imposes a criminal penalty as a means of
regulation without including any element of mens rea, the Court should
not imply an element of mens rea when (1) the person charged stands
in responsible relation to a public danger and (2) criminal penalties will
serve to make the regulation more effective.38 In justifying its
interpretation, the Court classified the legislation as "touch[ing] phases
of the lives and health of people which ... are largely beyond self-
protection."39
The Court's unique interpretation of the intent requirements of the
statutes in Balint, Dotterweich, and Morisette rested on the idea that
regulatory laws protecting public welfare should dispense with any intent
requirements not expressly included by Congress, because inserting such
30. Id.
31. Id at 254.
32. Id.
33. Strict liability is a concept of accountability wherein liability is determined by
whether an event occurred, rather than by whether an offender is made culpable by her
own negligent or intentional behavior. For a more complete explanation and
examination of strict liability, see I TORCIA, supra note 9, § 23.
34. Balint, 258 U.S. at 252.
35. Id.
36. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
37. Id. at 278, 280-81.
38. Id. at 280-81.
39. Id at 280.
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a requirement would hinder enforceability of the statute, limit its
effectiveness and contravene congressional purpose.4"
The Court again applied the Balint public welfare rationale, with
some modification, in the 1971 case of United States v. Freed.4' The
District Court dismissed the charge that Freed violated the Firearms Act
by possessing unregistered hand grenades, in part because of the state's
failure to allege scienter.42 The Court was faced, yet again, with a
question of how to interpret a statute which did not include intent as an
element. Focusing on the registration requirement, the Court reasoned
that because the statute was a "regulatory measure in the interest of
public safety ... [,] one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession
of hand grenades is not an innocent act."43 Thus, because of the public
welfare nature of the statute, the Court interpreted the statute as not
requiring any element of mens rea."
Freed is central to the development of the public safety doctrine
because in it, the Supreme Court took the public welfare rationale of the
Balint line of strict liability cases out of the strict liability context and
applied it to a statute which was not a true strict liability statute. 45
Prior to Freed, the Court had only used the public welfare rationale to
guide its interpretations of congressional silence regarding the element
40. If a statute is found to be a public welfare statute, the lower burden of proof
required will necessarily result in a greater ability to enforce the regulations in that
statute, at least for cases that go to trial. The state will be more likely to obtain a
conviction if it need only show that a defendant knew what he was doing, as compared
to having to prove that the defendant acted knowing that his act was unlawful. Some
critics have challenged the Court's reasoning in Balint and Dotterweich, arguing that
enforcement of a non-regulatory statute would be as much obstructed by its intent
requirement as enforcement of a regulatory statute would be. Webber, supra note 5,
at 53.
41. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
42. Id. at 604-05.
43. Id. at 609.
44. Id. at 607.
45. The statute in Freed was not a true strict liability statute because lower courts had
interpreted the statute to require that the defendant know that he possessed a firearm.
Id. at 607. If the Firearms Act were a true strict liability statute, it would not have
required any knowledge for a conviction. Note also that, if the statute was indeed a
public welfare regulation, the lower courts' interpretation of the statute as requiring this
knowledge was probably erroneous. The Balint line of cases demands that when
Congress is silent as to the element of scienter and the statute is a regulatory measure
in furtherance of the public welfare, no element of scienter should be implied by the
courts.
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of scienter. Freed marked the Court's first use of the public welfare
rationale to interpret a statute with a mens rea requirement. The Court
adapted the doctrine to help determine how much the defendant had to
know, rather than whether the defendant had to know anything at all.46
While extending the public welfare rationale beyond the strict
liability context, the Supreme Court offered in Freed a new justification
for the fact that the statute was designed to protect the public. In Balint
and Dotterweich, the public welfare character of a statute was used to
explain why Congress chose to subject an innocent person to criminal
punishment.4" In Freed, however, the Court used the fact that the
statute was in furtherance of public safety to conclude that a reasonable
person would have noticed that the matter would be subject to
regulation.4" A reasonable person, argued the Court, should know that
an item dangerous to public safety will be regulated, so long as that
person realizes the true nature of that item.49
As most criminal environmental statutes condition the use of
criminal punishment on a knowing violation, the transportation of the
public welfare rationale from the strict liability context to statutes which
require some element of mens rea made possible the eventual application
46. See id. at 609-10.
47. In Balint the Court reasoned that "Congress weighed the possible injustice of
subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent
purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result
preferably to be avoided." United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1921). In
Dotterweich, the Court explained that "[blalancing relative hardships, Congress has
preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing
themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of customers
before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent
public who are wholly helpless." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285
(1943).
48. Freed, 401 U.S. at 609. Applying the "congressional choice" reasoning of Balint
to the Freed situation, one would be forced to attempt to argue that the public welfare
nature of the statute indicated that Congress had balanced the various harms and
determined that the possessors of firearms should bear the burden of liability in order
to protect the public from a greater harm. This reasoning, however, does not explain
the lower courts' conclusion that the statute required that the defendant know that he
was possessing a firearm. Perhaps in an effort to avoid this problem, or perhaps simply
to avoid reasoning which seems to create legislative intent where there is no evidence
of it, the Court downplayed the congressional intent rationale, basing its conclusion
instead on the concept that the public welfare status of the thing regulated acted to put
the defendant on notice of the possibility of regulation.
49. Id
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of the public welfare rationale to these environmental statutes.
B. Public Welfare Statutes With Knowledge Requirements
By expanding the use of the public welfare rationale to a statute
that did not mention an element of scienter but that had been interpreted
to require some minimum knowledge on the part of the perpetrator, the
Supreme Court set the stage for the further expansion of the use of the
public welfare rationale. The doctrine was soon used by the Court to
interpret a statute that on its face required an element of scienter.
This expansion began with the case of United States v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp.,50 in which the government's
case was dismissed by the District Court on the grounds that the facts
alleged did not indicate a violation knowingly committed; the defendant
in that case allegedly violated a statute requiring notation on shipping
papers whenever a corrosive liquid was being shipped across state
lines." The statute stated that whoever "knowingly" violated its
provisions was subject to criminal punishment.52 The Supreme Court
was faced, just as in Freed, with determining the proper level of scienter
to attribute to a statute, but in this case the statute expressly required a
"knowing" violation. The Court concluded that the statute's knowledge
requirement meant having a knowledge of the facts." So long as the
transporter knew that he was carrying a corrosive liquid and knew he
was crossing a state line, he would be subject to conviction for a
violation knowingly committed. Knowledge of the regulation was not
required by the language of the statute, according to the Court, because
of the "dangerous" and "deleterious" nature of the thing regulated.54
The fact that the statute regulated an item dangerous to the public
safety provided the Court with the basis for concluding that Congress
intended "knowingly" to mean knowledge of the facts only, because the
dangerous nature of the item regulated should have alerted the defendant
to the possibility of its regulation. Thus, the Court used the public
welfare rationale to come to the same conclusion in both Freed and
International Minerals, despite the fact that in the latter the statute on its
50. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
51. Id. at 559.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 563.
54. Id. at 565.
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face required mens rea, whereas in the former, the statute was silent on
the issue.
From the International Minerals decision, one may conclude that
if the statute in question seeks to regulate a substance dangerous to the
public, "knowingly" violating it can mean as little as simply knowing the
facts of the situation." However, it was not until 1985 and the case of
Liparota v. United States56 that the Supreme Court indicated the scope
of this public welfare rationale by defining the limits of what constituted
a public welfare statute.
C. Non-Public Welfare Statutes With Knowledge Requirements
With Liparota v. United States, the Supreme Court defined the
limits of what constituted a public welfare statute and indicated how to
interpret an intent requirement in a non-public welfare statute. Liparota
was convicted of food stamp fraud under a statute which required that
"whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses
coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the
statute] or the regulations shall be guilty of a criminal offense." 57
Liparota had allegedly been buying the stamps at less than face
value and redeeming them to the government for face value, in violation
of the statute.58 The Court faced the question of whether the state must
prove that Liparota knew that his use was unauthorized by the statute, or
simply that he knew he was buying and selling food stamps. In rejecting
the state's argument that the food stamp regulation was in the nature of
a public welfare regulation, under which mens rea would be easier for
the state to prove, the Court said that public welfare regulations sought
to prevent the "type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is
subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the
community's health or safety."59 The Court explained that requiring the
state to prove that Liparota knew that his use of the stamps was not
authorized by the statute did not offer the defendant a mistake of law
55. At least one commentator has argued that International Minerals is not, in
actuality, part of the public welfare rationale line of cases. See Hansen, supra note 5,
at 1009-10.
56. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
57. Id. at 419.
58. Id. at 421.
59. Id. at 433.
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defense," because requiring the state to prove that one knows one's
actions are unauthorized is not the same as requiring the state to prove
that one knows one's actions are illegal.6'
Liparota clarifies the importance of the public welfare rationale
as well as the limits of its application. Because the food stamp law in
Liparota did not deal with a matter that "seriously threaten[ed] the
community's health or safety, 6 2 The Court did not find the statute to
be a public welfare statute. As a result, the Court interpreted the food
stamp statute knowledge requirement according to the general rule
evidenced in Morisette -- strictly against the state. The Court thus
determined that the state must show that the defendant knew that his use
of the food stamps was in a manner unauthorized by the statute. 3
Although Congress conditioned criminal punishment on a
"knowing" violation, the Court used the public welfare rationale to say,
in effect, that the type of harm the statute seeks to prevent will determine
how the Court must interpret the meaning of "knowingly." In the case
of a public welfare statute, a rule of interpretation that demands that the
enforceability of the statute be effectuated to the greatest degree possible
prevails over the general rule of statutory interpretation, which requires
that statutes be construed strictly against the state. The justifications for
applying this exception to the general rule are: first, the extreme degree
of danger to the public welfare that the statute seeks to prevent," and
second, the likelihood that the defendant will be alerted to the regulations
by the dangerous nature of the item. 5 In Liparota, the Court made
60. A mistake of law defense involves a defendant claiming that he ought not be
punished because he did not know of a law or realize that it applied to his conduct.
Such a defense is available to a defendant only in very limited circumstances. See I
TORCIA, supra note 9, § 77.
61. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 429-30. This distinction, if it indeed is a distinction at all,
is very difficult to comprehend. Justice Brennan may be pointing out the difference
between regulatory crimes and mala in se (bad in themselves) crimes. Whereas proving
that one know one's conduct is unauthorized may involve proving that one know one's
conduct is not allowed by a statute, proving that one know that one's conduct is illegal
may involve merely proving that one know one's conduct is wrong, which may be
assumed in the case of any mala in se crime. According to one commentator, the
difference between "unauthorized" and "unlawful" is of extreme importance. See
Hansen, supra note 5, at 1010-11.
62. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
65. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
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clear that food stamp fraud does not cause a sufficiently serious public
harm to justify abandoning the standard rule of interpretation."
Although we can determine from the cases the broadest limits of
the applicability of this rationale and rule of interpretation, its application
and effect when applied are uncertain. When deemed applicable by a
court, the public welfare rationale requires that court to interpret the
mens rea requirement of the statute in such a way as to best effectuate
the statutory purpose. In every case, such a requirement will mean
interpreting the mens rea requirement as narrowly as the language of the
statute will reasonably allow. A court must read the statute as requiring
for conviction as little mens rea as the plain meaning of the statute will
allow. 67
An understanding of the historical basis of the public welfare
rationale and accompanying rule of construction permits a critical
examination of the various interpretations of RCRA's knowledge
requirement.68 This examination not only indicates that the courts' use
of the rationale to interpret RCRA is consistent with the rationale's
foundations and purposes, it also counsels that some courts have not as
of yet interpreted the intent requirements of RCRA as restrictively as the
public welfare rationale requires.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF RCRA's KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
A. The Statutory Language of RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, or RCRA, is an
environmental protection statute passed in 1980 in part to help the federal
government keep better track of what private corporations and
individuals are doing with hazardous wastes.69 As one method of
enforcement, the Act provides for the criminal punishment of individuals
66. One commentator argues that the holding in Liparota limits how the public welfare
rationale operates. Hansen, supra note 5, at 1010. On the contrary, because the Court
in Liparota determined that the statute was not a public welfare statute, the issue of
how that rationale works was never reached. Thus, the opinion suggest when the public
welfare rationale operates, but not how it operates.
67. This, however, leaves the court with the obvious question of how narrow an
interpretation the language allows.
68. See RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) and infra note 70.
69. S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980).
1993] 229
WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENvIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol.18:219
who knowingly violate its provisions.70 Among the various offenses for
which the Act provides criminal enforcement, sections 3008(d)(1) and (2)
provide for the criminal punishment of "[a]ny person who knowingly
transports ... any hazardous waste ... to a facility which does not have a
permit, '"" as well as "[amny person who knowingly treats, stores, or
disposes of any hazardous waste ..., (A) without a permit ...; or (B) in
knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit. 02
B. The Early Cases
The first major case interpreting the criminal penalties provisions
of RCRA was United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. 7' decided by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1984. Johnson & Towers, which
has been called the "leading case" on the interpretation of the level of
knowledge necessary to sustain a conviction under section 3008(d)(2) of
70. RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). The section reads in pertinent part:
Any person who--
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit
under this subchapter, or pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C. 1411 et seq.],
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter--
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C. 1411 et
seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
such permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
any applicable interim status regulations or standards; ...
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of
violation, or imprisonment not to exceed two years (five years in the case of a violation
of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after
a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment under
the respective paragraph shall be doubled with respect to both fine and imprisonment.
71. RCRA § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1)). This subsection is also known as
the "transport provision."
72. RCRA § 3008(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2). This subsection is also known as the
''storage provision."
73. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
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RCRA,74 dealt with the criminal prosecution of a foreman and a mid-
level manager for knowing violations of RCRA permit requirements."
The company failed to get a permit before releasing hazardous wastes
into a nearby stream, a tributary of the Delaware River.76 The central
question of the case was which elements of the offense were modified
by the "knowingly" language."
That the statute met the requirements of a "public welfare" statute
was of little question to the court.7" "We conclude that in RCRA ...
Congress endeavored to control hazards that, 'in the circumstances of
modem industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.' 7 9 Using the
interpretive leeway afforded by the public welfare rationale as it had
been set forth in the Balint line of cases, the court rejected the
defendants' claim that the scope of the Act was limited to include only
owners and operators who bear responsibility for handling regulated
materials. Such an interpretational limitation on the statute, said the
court, would contravene the policy of seeking to construe regulatory
statutes intended to protect public welfare to effectuate their regulatory
purpose."0
Referring to the Balint line of strict liability cases that developed
the public welfare rationale, the court in Johnson & Towers admitted
that, given the nature of the harm sought to be prevented by RCRA,
"there would be a reasonable basis for reading the statute without any
mens rea requirement."'" However, "when applied to this statute,"
reasoned the court, "such a reading would be arbitrary and
nonsensical."' 2 Thus the court indicated a willingness to use the public
welfare rationale as an interpretive tool, but would not permit itself to
use this rationale to contravene the clear and plain language of the statute
74. lanelli, supra note 10, at 427.
75. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 663-64.
76. Id. at 664.
77. See id. at 667.
78. Id at 666. But see Hansen, supra note 5, at 1006-07 (arguing that RCRA is not
a public welfare statute). Her conclusion appears to be based on the premise that a
statute which on its face includes the element of intent by definition may never be a
public welfare statute. This author reads the cases differently. See supra text
accompanying notes 46-51.
79. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 667 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277 (1943)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 668.
82. Id.
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that requires some degree of mens rea.
This aspect of the court's decision is in accord with the prior
public welfare rationale cases. Prior to Johnson & Towers, no court had
used the public welfare rationale to abolish an intent requirement from
the face of a statute on the grounds that such an interpretation would
better effectuate the statutory purpose.83
The balance of the court's decision, however, planted a seed of
discontent that gave rise to a major interpretational controversy.
Reasoning "either that the omission of the word 'knowing' in (A) [of
section 3008(d)(2)] was inadvertent or that 'knowingly' which introduces
subsection (2) applies to subsection (A),"" the court concluded that
section 3008(d)(2)(A) must be knowingly violated (as to all the elements
listed therein) for conviction to lie.85 This conclusion meant that in
order for a defendant to be convicted under § (A) of § 3008(d)(2), the
state must establish that the particular defendant knew both that he was
disposing of hazardous material and that such disposal was not allowed
by the statute.
In an attempt to limit the harmful effects to statutory enforcement
of its conclusion, the court referred to the International Minerals case for
the proposition that when items of great danger are regulated, "'anyone
who is in possession of them ... must be presumed to be aware of the
regulation." 86 The court appears to suggest that although the statute
requires knowledge of the regulation, such knowledge can be assumed
when the defendant deals extensively in the regulated field.87 The
ultimate effect of the Third Circuit's ruling in Johnson & Towers is to
83. To do so would be directly contrary to congressional intent, expressed by the
inclusion of a mens rea requirement in the language of the statute. Indeed, the
justification for the public welfare that suggests that the rule of construction engendered
by the rationale serves only to aid the court in interpreting congressional silence or
ambiguity. This justification breaks down if the rationale is used to contravene plain
statutory language.
84. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 669 (quoting United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402
U.S. 558, 565 (1971)).
87. This rationale could raise constitutional questions by suggesting that the
government need not prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). However, when this concept is couched, as it is,
in the language of circumstantial evidence and assumptions rather than presumptions,
the court appears to be simply suggesting an inference that would not be contrary to
notions of constitutional criminal law.
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place a higher burden on the state when it seeks to convict low level
employees under the storage provision of RCRA; lower level workers
must be shown to have actually known of the existence of the RCRA
regulations."8 In contrast, the ruling places a lower burden on the state
when it seeks to convict corporate officers, whose knowledge of the
existence of the RCRA provisions may be inferred. 9
In United States v. Hayes lntT,9' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the reasoning used by the Third
Circuit in the Johnson & Towers storage provision case to interpret the
knowledge requirement of section 3008(d)(1) of RCRA. Hayes involved
the alleged violation of the transport provision of RCRA by a corporation
and an individual employee of that corporation and arose from the
transportation of hazardous waste to a disposer who lacked the proper
permit.91 Again, the determination of what elements of the offense
were modified by the statute's "knowingly" language confronted the
court. Agreeing with the Third Circuit that RCRA is a public welfare
statute, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Liparota did not control.'
Thus, a defendant could not assert as a defense that he or she did not
realize that RCRA created a permit requirement or that the paint, of
which he or she was disposing, was classified as hazardous by federal
law.93 The Eleventh Circuit, however, agreed with the Third Circuit
that the transport provision's mens rea requirement, just as in the storage
provision, should be read to constrain the state from assuming a
defendant's mens rea -- the state must prove a defendant's "ill will." To
read the mens rea provision as requiring less proof of "bad intent" would,
according to the court, "criminalize innocent conduct."94
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the "knowingly"
language modified all the elements of the offense as set forth in section
3008(d)(1). 9' According. to the Eleventh Circuit's reading of the
88. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665.
89. At least one commentator has suggested that such a bi-leveled pattern of
enforcement is the practical result of the Johnson & Towers decision. See Milne, supra
note 4, at 330. See also Hansen, supra note 5, at 1004-07 (analyzing court's
application of "knowing" requirement to employee defendants).
90. 786 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986).
91. Id. at 1500-01.
92. Id. at 1503.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1504.
95. Id at 1505.
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transport provision of RCRA, in order for the state to obtain a conviction
it must show that the transporter knew of the permit status of the
disposer and that the status failed to meet RCRA standards.
96
Therefore, as the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the transport provision,
failure to know the permit status of the waste receiver would be a valid
defense to a section 3008(d)(1) transport action, whereas failure to know
that the law required a permit at all would not be a valid defense.
The Eleventh Circuit, echoing words of the Third Circuit in
Johnson & Towers, noted that the defendant's involvement in the waste
disposal business would be evidence of his knowledge of RCRA
requirements.97 The practical effect of this reasoning was no different
than in the Johnson & Towers case: the court's interpretation created a
higher level of proof in order to convict a low level worker, because
circumstantial evidence of an individual's involvement in the waste
disposal business is not as likely to suggest that the low level worker had
knowledge of the permit status of the disposer.
In these early cases interpreting RCRA's prohibitions against
storage and transportation of hazardous waste, the courts relied on the
public welfare rationale to justify a reduced burden of proof for mens rea
than would have been required if the statute were not a public welfare
statute.9" In neither of these cases did the court conclude that the
statute required the extreme burden of proof that the court required of the
state in Liparota, a non-public welfare statute case. Nevertheless, when
interpreting the scope of the intent language, these courts used tortured
reasoning to read "knowingly" as applying to every element of the
offense. Such interpretations of the "knowingly" language do not mesh
well with the public welfare rationale as it was developed outside RCRA
cases.
Outside the realm of RCRA, the public welfare rationale justifies
a rule of construction that dictates that a court must interpret the mens
rea required by the statute as narrowly as possible without contravening
the clear language of the 'statute in order to effectuate the regulatory
purpose of preventing harm to the public." The Third Circuit's
interpretation of the storage provision and the Eleventh Circuit's use of
the Third Circuit's reasoning to interpret the transport provision were
96. See id. at 1504.
97. Id.
98. See Milne, supra note 4, at 329; Hansen, supra note 5, at 1005-06.
99. See supra note 40.
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both soon challenged by other circuits."° These circuits found the
power of the public welfare rationale to be much greater than recognized
by the Third or Eleventh Circuits in either Johnson & Towers or
Hayes.10'
C. Reevaluation of RCRA: Two Circuit Splits
1. The Storage Provision Split
The first challenge to the Third Circuit's interpretation of the
storage provision of RCRA came from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hoflin.'02 Hoflin
involved a public works director charged with improperly disposing of
hazardous waste by failing to obtain the permit required by RCRA.'0 3
Taking a fresh look at the storage provision of RCRA, ° the Ninth
Circuit concluded that because subsection (2)(A) of this provision does
not include the word "knowingly," whereas subsection (2)(B) does,
Congress intentionally left the knowledge requirement out of subsection
(2)(A)."° Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, section 3008(d)(2)(A)
does not require the state to show that the defendant knew of the lack of
a permit before he can be convicted. 0 6  Acknowledging that its
interpretation conflicted with that of the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
argued that the language of the section was clear, and that the basis on
which the Third Circuit extended the scope of the knowledge requirement
was not sound.'07
In defense of its interpretation, the Ninth Circuit relied not only
on rules of grammar and common sense, but also on the public welfare
100. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1083 (1990); United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1852 (1993); United States v. Speach, No. 90-50708 (9th Cir., March 20, 1992).
101. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); United States v. Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d 1499 (1 1th Cir.
1986).
102. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
103. Id. at 1035.
104. RCRA § 3008(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
105. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037.
106. Id. at 1039. This decision by the Ninth Circuit was contrary to the conclusion
of the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers.
107. Id. at 1038.
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rationale as presented in Dotterweich and International Minerals.,"
"In the face of ... obvious congressional action we will not write
something into the statute which Congress so plainly left out."'"19
"[O]ur conclusion is consistent with RCRA's goals and the treatment
Congress gave 'knowledge' in [section 3008(d)(2)(A) and (B) of RCRA]
to achieve these goals.""'  Given the purpose and language of the
statute, the Ninth Circuit found the Third Circuit's attempt to. create a
knowledge requirement where none existed to be in direct contradiction
with the reasoning and result demanded by the relevant rules of statutory
interpretation."'
According to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, in order for the
state to convict under the storage provision, the state must prove only
that the defendant made no mistake of fact in the true identity of the
hazardous material involved."' The court explained that section
3008(d)(2) required the state to show that the defendant knew that the
substance he was handling was sludge from a sewage treatment plant and
"had the potential to be harmful to others and the environment," but not
that he knew that such sludge was classified by law as "hazardous
waste."' 13
By refusing to copy the Third Circuit's knowledge requirement,
created in Johnson & Towers, the Ninth Circuit effectively abolished the
distinction between higher and lower-level employees created by the
Third Circuit. Under the Third Circuit interpretation, circumstantial
evidence is likely to be more effective in establishing the requisite
knowledge in the case of a higher-level worker."4 According to the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation, the state does not bear the burden of
proving that the defendant knew that a permit was required. Thus, this
interpretation frees the state from relying on circumstantial evidence to
make this proof, and the discrepancy in the treatment of the two classes
of workers created by the Third Circuit reading disappears.
Other circuits have subscribed to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.
The Sixth Circuit recently adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
108. Id. See text accompanying notes 32-40, 47-49.
109. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1039.
113. Id.
114. See Milne supra note 4, at 331-32.
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section 3008(d)(2) of RCRA" 5 in the case of United States v.
Dean."6  The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation at the District Court level in United States v. Laughlin."7
The impact of Hoflin, however, has since been extended beyond the
storage provision of section 3008(d) of RCRA. The Eleventh Circuit's
challenge of the Third Circuit's reasoning has prompted another split in
the federal circuits, this time over the proper interpretation of the
"knowingly" language of section 3008(d)(1) of RCRA, the transport
provision. "'
2. The Transport Provision Split
The break from the Third Circuit's interpretation of section 3008
of RCRA, applied by the Eleventh Circuit to the transport subsection in
the Hayes case, came in United States v. Speach,"9 decided in March
of 1992 by the Ninth Circuit. Speach involved the conviction of a
transport company president for storing waste without a permit in
violation of the storage provision of section 3008(d)(4) and for transport
of waste to a facility that lacked a permit in violation of the transport
provision of section 3008(d)(1). 2 As in Hayes, the question facing
the court was to what elements of the offense of transportation of
hazardous waste the "knowingly" language of section 3008(d)(1)
attaches. In direct contradiction of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
of the transport provision, the Ninth Circuit, relying on its holding in
Hoflin, held that the statute did not require the state to prove that the
defendant had knowledge of the permit status of the receiving
facility.'' One commentator has written that, after the Hoflin decision,
such a conclusion was the only possible consistent result. 22
The rationale for the Hoflin holding, that proof of knowledge of
permit status is not required, is exactly the same for a storage case as it
is for a transport case. Just as "knowingly" modifies "stores" and does
115. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
116. 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993).
117. 768 F. Supp. 957 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1).
119. No. 90-50708 (9th Cir., Mar. 20, 1992).
120. Gary S. Lincenberg, Lowered Intent Requirements in Environmental Crimes
Cases, 7 CRM. JUST. 28, 32 (1992).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 31.
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not modify "without a permit" under section 3008(d)(2), "knowingly"
modifies "transports" and does not modify "to a facility which does not
have a permit" under section 3008(d)(1).'
Although the majority opinion in Speach based its interpretation
on a plain meaning rationale, a concurring judge reached the same result
by focusing exclusively on the public welfare nature of the statute at
issue.'24 Such a use of the public welfare rationale is fully consistent
with the rationale set forth in earlier cases."'2 As a construction device,
the rationale demands that when a regulatory statute seeks to prevent a
significant public harm, the court must interpret the statute in order to
best "effectuate the statutory purpose."' 26 The public welfare rationale
is not designed to defeat or intentionally misconstrue the clear language
of a statute, or the intent of Congress expressed therein. Rather, this
rationale demands an interpretation that best enables the statute to
regulate the conduct it seeks in order to best prevent the public harm
caused by that conduct. In the case of section 3008(d)(1) of RCRA, a
strict interpretation of the statute's mens rea requirement will best enable
the statute to accomplish the regulatory purpose for which it was created.
A strict reading of the statutory language demands that "knowingly"
refers only to "transports to a facility" and not to "a facility which does
not have a permit."' 117 The rules of grammar and statutory construction
serve to buttress the interpretation suggested by this rationale.
The Speach case, and the interpretation dispute it created, is not
without its drama. Within two months of the March decision, the Ninth
Circuit withdrew the opinion from publication, thereby making it
unavailable as precedent. 2 Speculating as to why the Ninth Circuit
would withdraw this opinion, one commentator has suggested that "rather
than end[ing] the debate [over the interpretation of RCRA], the Speach
case has sharpened it.... Perhaps the Ninth Circuit felt that the debate
was being sharpened too much." 1
29
123. Id See RCRA § 3008(d)(I)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1)-(2) or supra note 70 for
text of statute.
124. Lincenberg. supra note 120, at 32.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1972); United States v.
International Minerals, 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971).
126. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975). Park is a member of the
Balint line of strict liability public welfare statute cases.
127. See RCRA § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1).
128. Lincenberg, supra note 120, at 32.
129. Id.
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3. Evaluating the Interpretations. The Role of The Public Welfare
Rationale
As much as the Ninth Circuit may wish to avoid a showdown
over the interpretation of the intent requirements of section 3008(d) of
RCRA, such a showdown is imminent. The Ninth Circuit's rejection of
the Third Circuit's approach to interpreting the language of RCRA's
storage provision necessarily has consequences for the interpretation of
the transportation clause. However, the divisions -between the approaches
taken by the two circuits are even more far ranging than disputes over
the proper interpretation of statutory language. In a more fundamental
sense, the dispute really involves the proper role of the public welfare
rationale as a construction device for regulatory statutes.
The dispute between the circuits over the public welfare rationale
is based on the difference of degree to which the public welfare rationale
guides a court in statutory interpretation. According to the Third and
Eleventh Circuits, the public welfare rationale permits a court to interpret
a statute as not requiring proof that a violator had knowledge of the
unlawfulness of the act. 3° This easing of the government's burden is
as far as the rationale goes in aiding construction."'3 Once beyond the
scope of the public welfare rationale, the Third and Eleventh Circuits
look at the statute with reason as their lone interpretational guide. Thus
in the case of the storage provision of RCRA,'32 a court must ask itself
whether reading the statute as not requiring a knowing violation when
waste is stored without a permit is fair in light of the fact that the statute
clearly requires a knowing violation before a defendant may be convicted
of violating the terms of such a permit. The Third and Eleventh Circuits
say that such a reading is not fair, and thus cannot be accurate.
In defense of their interpretations of the mens rea requirements of
section 3008(d) of RCRA, both the Third and Eleventh Circuits argue
that the public welfare rationale allows an inference from circumstantial
evidence that certain classes of violators did have the knowledge required
130. See United States v. Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. .1986); United
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985).
131. Note, however, that the Third Circuit used the rationale in the Johnson & Towers
case to reject an argument that the statute applied only to owners and operators, not to
employees. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-66.
132. RCRA § 3008(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
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by the statute, as interpreted by the courts.'33 Thus, these circuits
might argue, reading the mens rea requirement broadly does not actually
hinder the statutory objective. However, as prior discussion has
indicated, 34 for RCRA, whenever any element is added to those that
the state must prove, the statutory objective is hindered to some degree.
Consider, for example, the low level employee at a hazardous
waste handling company. Because it is the employee's business to know
the regulations imposed on the industry, the company will presumably
know the nature of regulations which affect it. Realizing that having its
employees convicted for regulatory violations will hurt business --
because workers cannot work if they are in jail and because people will
not wish to work in the industry if they are likely to be prosecuted -- the
company will have a significant incentive to ensure that such convictions
do not occur. The company can protect itself by taking precautions to
avoid violations and by informing the low level workers of what
constitutes a violation, enabling these workers to prevent any potential
violations. The result of such widespread knowledge of the regulations
will almost certainly be a decrease in violations, and, in turn, a decrease
in the chance that the public will be harmed by a regulated hazardous
substance. Such a result is undeniably a better effectuation of the
statutory purpose. Thus, although the limited application of the public
welfare rationale practiced by the Third and Eleventh Circuits does not
devastate the statutory purpose, it does hinder the statutory purpose in
that it does not give the fullest effect possible to the regulatory purpose.
The approach used by the Ninth Circuit in the Hoflin and Speach
cases, however, does not similarly frustrate the regulatory purpose.
These cases illustrate how a court can fully implement the public welfare
rationale without contravening the statutory language. The limit of the
rationale is clear; even though the statute protects the public from great
harm does not allow the court to contravene clear language in an effort
to better effectuate the statutory purpose. Conversely, one might argue
that when a statute requires a "knowing" violation, it clearly requires that
the state prove that the defendant knew that his behavior was prohibited
by the statute before he may be convicted under the statute. Thus, the
use of the public welfare rationale to reduce the government's burden of
proof of mens rea would contravene the clear language of the statute.
This argument must fail in light of the Liparota case. In
133. Johnson & Towers. 741 F.2d at 669; Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504-05.
134. See supra part I.C.
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Liparota, the Supreme Court points out the various interpretations that
could be given to a knowledge requirement. 5 The fact that the Court
finds more than one possible interpretation necessitates the conclusion
that there is no "plain meaning" to be given to a requirement that a crime
be committed "knowingly.' 36 Because a knowledge requirement is not
self defining, the Supreme Court examines the range of possibilities of
meaning evoked by such a requirement. Among these possibilities are
the most basic requirement that one know the facts surrounding the
event,137 and the most extensive requirement that one know that one's
conduct is not authorized by law. 38
The Supreme Court, in an attempt to define the knowledge
requirement, has held that the purpose of the statute, as interpreted under
the public welfare doctrine, is controlling. "9  When the statutory
purpose is to prevent a serious harm from befalling the public and the
statute is a regulatory measure, the Court will opt for the least stringent
in the range of possible interpretations -- the one requiring the least mens
rea.
To understand why reading a statute to require such a limited
level of mens rea is not a contravention of the statutory knowledge
requirement, one need only compare a statute read in this way to a
statute read to require strict liability. A strict liability statute demands
that if a given event occurs, anyone with a responsible relation to that
event is liable regardless of intent or fault. 40 The defendant is
afforded no mistake of law defense. The inclusion of a knowledge
requirement in a statute clearly indicates that the legislature did not
intend that the statute be a strict liability statute. So long as a court
interprets the statute to allow a mistake of law defense, the statute has
not been interpreted by that court as a strict liability statute, and the
135. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-26 (1985). Indeed, Congress itself
recognized the ambiguity of the term when it expressly left to the courts the task of
determining the meaning of RCRA's "knowingly" language. See Concannon, supra
note 6, at 540 & n.42.
136. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Liparota says as much: "Beyond [the fact that the
use of the word 'knowingly' by Congress indicates its desire that some mental state be
required] the words themselves provide little guidance." Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424.
137. This is not strict liability, because a mistake of fact defense would be available
to a defendant. See supra note 33 and text accompanying notes 33-35.
138. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423.
139. Id at 423-25.
140. See supra note 33.
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clearly expressed legislative intent has not been contravened.
Given the nature of the public welfare rationale as it developed,
first in strict liability cases and then in statutes requiring some mens rea,
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 3008(d) of RCRA is more
consistent with the public welfare rationale than is the interpretation
given this section by the Third and Eleventh Circuits. The public
welfare rationale demands that when a court is interpreting a regulatory
statute that seeks to prevent one of a group of certain specified types of
public harm,"4 the court must interpret the statute so as to best
effectuate the regulatory purpose. A less burdensome mens rea standard
makes enforcement of a statute easier for the government. An easily
enforced statute is more likely to deter potential violators and to punish
actual violators. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of RCRA's
language requiring knowledge is the interpretation required by the public
welfare rationale.
III. CONCLUSION
The public welfare rationale requires that when a regulatory
statute seeks to prevent a serious public harm, the language of that statute
should be interpreted so as to best effectuate the regulatory purpose,
thereby protecting the public from that harm to the greatest degree.
42
Currently, this rationale has been applied by courts to regulatory statutes
which target such items as misbranded
43 and dangerous drugs,144
hand grenades,' 45 caustic chemicals,'" and hazardous wastes. 47
The federal courts have time and again concluded that RCRA is
a public welfare statute. In interpreting the intent requirements of
RCRA, however, these courts have not applied fully the rule of
construction which follows from such a classification. When applied, the
141. See infra text accompanying notes 142-47.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34, 78-89, 98 and 124-34.
143. E.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
144. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
145. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
146. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
147. See, e.g., Unites States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1083 (1990). Although traditionally used by courts only when the threat of harm to the
public is immediate and deadly, the rationale might arguably be used to interpret
statutes that seek to prevent equally serious, but less immediate and overtly threatening,
public harms.
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public welfare rationale's rule of construction demands that courts re-
examine their interpretation of the mens rea required by these statutes to
ensure that they have met this rationale's demands; namely, that the court
has interpreted the statute such that its regulatory purpose is best
effectuated without contravening the clear statutory language. When
courts recognize the full scope of the public welfare rationale, not only
will the differences in interpretation of RCRA be resolved, but
environmental protection statutes protecting the public health and welfare
also will finally be given the muscle they need to protect our nation's
waters, air, and soil for all future citizens.
